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CORRESPONDENCE 


IN  RELATION   TO 


THE  PUBLIC  MEETING  AT  ALBANY,  N.  Y. 


LETTER  OF  THE  COMMITTEE  AND  RESOLUTIONS. 

ALBANY,  'May  19,  1863. 

To  his  Excellency  the  President  of  the  United  States  : 

The  undersigned,  officers  of  a  public  meeting  held  at  the  city  of  Albany  on 
the  16th  day  of  May  instant,  herewith  transmit  to  your  excellency  a  copy  of 
the  resolutions  adopted  at  the  said  meeting,  and  respectfully  request  your  earnest 
consideration  of  them.  They  deem  it  proper  on  their  personal  responsibility  to 
state  that  the  meeting  was  one  of  the  most  respectable  as  to  numbers  and  char- 
acter, and  one  of  the  most  earnest  in  the  support  of  the  Union,  ever  held  in  this 
city. 

Yours,  with  great  regard, 

ERASTUS  CORNING,  President. 
ELI  PERRY,    Vice-President. 
PETER  GANSEVOORT,    Vice- President. 
PETER  MONTEATH,    Vice  President. 
SAMUEL  W.  GIBBS,    Vice- President. 
JOHN  NIBLACK,    Vice-President. 
H.  W.  McCLELLAN,    Vice-President. 
LEMUEL  W.  RODGERS,    Vice-President. 
WILLIAM  SEYMOUR,    Vice-President. 
JEREMIAH  OSBORN,    Vice-President. 
WM.  S.  PADOCK,    Vice-President. 
J.  B.  SANDERS,    Vice-President. 
EDWARD   MULCAHY,    Vice- President. 
D.  V.  N.  RADCLIFFE,    Vice-President. 
WILLIAM  A.  RICE,  Secretary. 
EDWARD  NEWCOMB,    Secretary. 
R.  W.  PECKHAM,  JR.,  Secretary. 
M.  A.  NOLAN,  Secretary. 
JOHN  R.  NESSEL,  Secretary. 
C.  W.  WEEKS,  Secretary. 


Resolutions  adopted  at  the  meeting  held  in  Albany,  N.  Y.,  on  the  16th  day  of  May,  1863. 

Resolved,  That  the  democrats  of  New  York  point  to  their  uniform  course  of  action  during 
the  two  years  of  civil  war  through  which  we  have  passed,  to  the  alacrity  which  they  have 
evinced  in  filling  the  ranks  of  the  army,  to  their  contributions  and  sacrifices,  as  the  evidence 
of  their  patriotism  and  devotion  to  the  cause  of  our  imperilled  country.  Never  in  the  history 
of  civil  wars  has  a  government  been  sustained  with  such  ample  resources  of  means  and  men. 
as  the  people  have  voluntarily  placed  in  the  hands  of  this  administration. 


Resolved,  That,  as  democrats,  we  are  determined  to  maintain  this  patriotic  attitude,  and, 
despite  of  adverse  and  disheartening1  circumstances,  to  devote  all  our  energies  to  sustain  the 
cause  of  the  Union,  to  secure  peace  through  victory,  and  to  bring  back  the  restoration  of  all 
the  States  under  the  safeguards  of  the  Constitution. 

Resolved,  That  while  we  will  not  consent  to  be  misapprehended  upon  these  points,  we  are 
determined  not  to  be  misunderstood  in  regard  to  others  not  less  essential.  We  demand  that 
the  administration  shall  be  true  to  the  Constitution ;  shall  recognize  and  maintain  the  rights 
of  the  States  and  the  liberties  of  the  citizen ;  shall  everywhere,  outside  of  the  lines  of  neces- 
sary military  occupation  and  the  scenes  of  insurrection,  exert  all  its  powers  to  maintain  the 
supremacy  of  the  civil  over  military  law. 

Resolved,  That,  in  view  of  these  principles,  we  denounce  the  recent  assumption  of  a  mili- 
tary commander  to  seize  and  try  a  citizen  of  Ohio,  Clement  L.  Vallandigham,  for  no  other 
reason  than  words  addressed  to  a  public  meeting,  in  criticism  of  the  course  of  the  ad- 
ministration, and  in  condemnation  of  the  military  orders  of  that  general. 

Resolved,  That  this  assumption  of  power  by  a  military  tribunal,  if  successfully  asserted, 
not  only  abrogates  the  right  of  the  people  to  assemble  and  discuss  the  affairs  of  government, 
the  liberty  of  speech  and  of  the  press,  the  right  of  trial  by  jury,  the  law  of  evidence,  and  the 
privilege  of  habeas  corpus,  but  it  strikes  a  fatal  blow  at  the  supremacy  of  law,  and  the  au- 
thority of  the  State  and  federal  constitutions. 

Resolved,  That  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States — the  supreme  law  of  the  land — has 
defined  the  crime  of  treason  against  the  United  States  to  consist  "only  in  levying  war 
against  them,  or  adhering  to  their  enemies,  giving-  them  aid  and  comfort;"  and  has  provided 
that  "no  person  shall  be  convicted  of  treason,  unless  on  the  testimony  of  two  witnesses  to 
the  same  overt  act,  or  on  confession  in  open  court."  And  it  further  provides  that  "no  per- 
son shall  be  held  to  answer  for  a  capital  or  otherwise  infamous  crime,  unless  on  a  present- 
ment or  indictment  of  a  grand  jury,  except  in  cases  arising  in  the  land  and  naval  forces,  or 
in  the  militia,  when  in  actual  service  in  time  of  war  or  public  danger;"  and  further,  that 
"in  all  criminal  prosecutions,  the  accused  shall  enjoy  the  right  of  a  speedy  and  public  trial 
by  an  impartial  jury  of  the  State  and  district  wherein  the  crime  was  committed." 

Resolved,  That  these  safeguards  of  the  rights  of  the  citizen  against  the  pretensions  of 
arbitrary  power  were  intended  more  especially  for  his  protection  in  times  of  civil  commotion. 
They  were  secured  substantially  to  the  English  people,  after  years  of  protracted  civil  war,  and 
were  adopted  into  our  Constitution  at  the  close  of  the  revolution.  They  have  stood  the  test 
of  seventy-six  years  of  trial,  under  our  republican  system,  under  circumstances  which  show 
that,  while  they  constitute  the  foundation  of  all  free  government,  they  are  the  elements  of  the 
enduring  stability  of  the  republic. 

Resolved,  That,  in  adopting  the  language  of  Daniel  Webster,  we  declare,  "It  is  the  ancient 
and  undoubted  prerogative  of  this  people  to  canvass  public  measures  and  the  merits  of  public 
men."  It  is  a  "home-bred  right,"  a  fireside  privilege.  It  had  been  enjoyed  in  every  house, 
cottage,  and  cabin  in  the  nation.  It  is  as  undoubted  as  the  right  of  breathing  the  air  or 
walking  on  the  earth.  Belonging-  to  private  life  as  a  right,  it  belongs  to  public  life  as  a  duty, 
and  it  is  the  last  duty  which  those  whose  representatives  we  are  shall  find  us  to  abandon. 
Aiming  at  all  times  to  be  courteous  and  temperate  in  its  use,  except  when  the  right  itself  is 
questioned,  we  shall  place  ourselves  on  the  extreme  boundary  of  our  own  right  and  bid 
defiance  to  any  arm  that  would  move  us  from  our  ground.  "This  high  constitutional  privi- 
lege we  shall  defend  and  exercise  in  all  places — in  time  of  peace,  in  time  of  war,  and  at  all 
times.  Living,  we  shall  assert  it ;  and  should  we  leave  no  other  inheritance  to  our  children, 
by  the  blessing  of  God  we  will  leave  them  the  inheritance  of  free  principles  and  the  example 
of  a  manly,  independent,  and  constitutional  defence  of  them." 

Resolved,  That  in  the  election  of  Governor  Seymour,  the  people  of  this  State,  by  an  em- 
phatic majority,  declared  their  condemnation  of  the  system  of  arbitrary  arrests  and  their  de- 
termination to  stand  by  the  Constitution.  That  the  revival  of  this  lawless  system  can  have 
but  one  result:  to  divide  and  distract  the  north,  and  destroy  its  confidence  in  the  purposes  of 
the  administration.  That  we  deprecate  it  as  an  element  of  confusion  at  home,  of  weakness 
to  our  armies  in  the  field,  and  as  calculated  to  lower  the  estimate  of  American  character  and 
magnify  the  apparent  peril  of  our  cause  abroad.  And  that,  regarding  the  blow  struck  at  a 
citizen  of  Ohio  as  aimed  at  the  rights  of  every  citizen  of  the  north,  we  denounce  it  as  against 
the  spirit  of  our  laws  and  Constitution,  and  most  earnestly  call  upon  the  President  of  the 
United  States  to  reverse  the  action  of  the  military  tribunal  which  has  passed  a  "cruel  and 
unusual  punishment"  upon  the  party  arrested,  prohibited  in  terms  by  the  Constitution,  and 
to  restore  him  to  the  liberty  of  which  he  has  been  deprived. 

Resolved,  That  the  president,  vice-presidents,  and  secretary  of  this  meeting  be  requested 
to_  transmit  a  copy  of  these  resolutions  to  his  Excellency  the  President  of  the  United  States, 
with  the  assurance  of  this  meeting  of  their  hearty  and  earnest  desire  to  support  the  govern 
ment  in  every  constitutional  and  lawful  measure  to  suppress  the  existing  rebellion. 


MR.  LINCOLN'S  REPLY. 


EXECUTIVE  MANSION, 

Washington,  June  12,  1863. 
Hon.  Erastus  Corning  and  others  : 

GENTLEMEN  :  Your  letter  of  May  19,  enclosing  the  resolutions  of  a  public 
meeting  held  at  Albany,  New  York,  on  the  16th  of  the  same  month,  was  re- 
ceived several  days  ago. 

The  resolutions,  as  I  understand  them,  are  resolvable  into  two  propositions — 
first,  the  expression  of  a  purpose  to  sustain  the  cause  of  the  Union,  to  secure 
peace  through  victory,  and  to  support  the  administration  in  every  constitutional 
and  lawful  measure  to  suppress  the  rebellion;  and  secondly,  a  declaration  of 
censure  upon  the  administration  for  supposed  unconstitutional  action,  such  as 
the  making  of  military  arrests.  And,  from  the  two  propositions,  a  third  is  de- 
duced, which  is  that  the  gentlemen  composing  the  meeting  are  resolved  on 
doing  their  part  to  maintain  our  common  government  and  country,  despite  the 
folly  or  wickedness,  as  they  may  conceive,  of  any  administration.  This  posi- 
tion is  eminently  patriotic,  and  as  such,  I  thank  the  meeting,  and  congratulate 
the  nation  for  it.  My  own  purpose  is  the  same;  so  that  the  meeting  and  myself 
have  a  common  object,  and  can  have  no  difference,  except  in  the  choice  of 
means  or  measures  for  effecting  that  object. 

And  here  I  ought  to  close  this  paper,  and  would  close  it,  if  there  were  no 
apprehension  that  more  injurious  consequences  than  any  merely  personal  to 
myself  might  follow  the  censures  systematically  cast  upon  me  for  doing  what, 
in  my  view  of  duty,  I  could  not  forbear.  The  resolutions  promise  to  support 
me  in  every  constitutional  and  lawful  measure  to  suppress  the  rebellion ;  and  I 
have  not  knowingly  employed,  nor  shall  knowingly  employ,  any  other.  But 
the  meeting,  by  their  resolutions,  assert  and  argue  that  certain  military  ar- 
rests, and  proceedings  following  them,  for  which  I  am  ultimately  responsible, 
are  unconstitutional.  I  think  they  are  not.  The  resolutions  quote  from  the 
Constitution  the  definition  of  treason,  and  also  the  limiting  safeguards  and 
guarantees  therein  provided  for  the  citizen  on  trials  for  treason,  and  on  his 
being  held  to  answer  for  capital  or  otherwise  infamous  crimes,  and,  in  criminal 
prosecutions,  his  right  to  a  speedy  and  public  trial  by  an  impartial  jury.  They 
proceed  to  resolve  "  that  these  safeguards  of  the  rights  of  the  citizen  against 
the  pretensions  of  arbitrary  power  were  intended  more  especially  for  his  protec- 
tion in  times  of  civil  commotion."  And,  apparently  to  demonstrate  the  propo- 
sition, the  resolutions  proceed :  "  They  were  secured  substantially  to  the  Eng- 
lish people  after  years  of  protracted  civil  war,  and  were  adopted  into  our  Con- 


stitution  at  the  close  of  the  revolution."  Would  not  the  demonstration  have 
been  better,  if  it  could  have  been  truly  said  that  these  safeguards  had  been 
adopted  and  applied  during  the  civil  wars  and  during  our  revolution,  instead  of 
after  the  one  and  at  the  close  of  the  other?  I,  too,  am  devotedly  for  them  after 
civil  war,  and  before  civil  war,  and  at  all  times,  "  except  when,  in  cases  of  re- 
bellion or  invasion,  the  public  safety  may  require"  their  suspension.  The  reso- 
lutions proceed  to  tell  us  that  these  safeguards  "have  stood  the  test  of  seventy- 
six  years  of  trial,  under  our  republican  system,  under  circumstances  which  show 
that  while  they  constitute  the  foundation  of  all  free  government,  they  are  the 
elements  of  the  enduring  stability  of  the  republic."  No  one  denies  that 
they  have  so  stood  the  test  up  to  the  beginning  of  the  present  rebellion,  if 
we  except  a  certain  occurence  at  New  Orleans ;  nor  does  any  one  question 
that  they  will  stand  the  same  test  much  longer  after  the  rebellion  closes. 
But  these  provisions  of  the  Constitution  have  no  application  to  the  case  we  have 
in  hand,  because  the  arrests  complained  of  were  not  made  for  treason — that  is, 
not  for  the  treason  defined  in  the  Constitution,  and  upon  the  conviction  of  which 
the  punishment  is  death — nor  yet  were  they  made  to  hold  persons  to  answer  for 
any  capital  or  otherwise  infamous  crimes ;  nor  were  the  proceedings  following, 
in  any  constitutional  or  legal  sense,  "criminal  prosecutions."  The  arrests  were 
made  on  totally  different  grounds,  and  the  proceedings  following  accorded  with 
the  grounds  of  the  arrests.  Let  us  consider  the  real  case  with  which  we  are 
dealing,  and  apply  to  it  the  parts  of  the  Constitution  plainly  made  for  such  cases. 
Prior  to  my  installation  here  it  had  been  inculcated  that  any  State  had  a  lawful 
right  to  secede  from  the  national  Union,  and  that  it  would  be  expedient  to  exercise 
the  right  whenever  the  devotees  of  the  doctrine  should  fail  to  elect  a  President 
to  their  own  liking.  I  was  elected  contrary  to  their  liking ;  and,  accordingly, 
so  far  as  it  was  legally  possible,  they  had  taken  seven  States  out  of  the  Union, 
had  seized  many  of  the  United  States  forts,  and  had  fired  upon  the  United 
States  flag,  all  before  I  was  inaugurated,  and,  of  course,  before  I  had  done  any 
official  act  whatever.  The  rebellion  thus  began  soon  ran  into  the  present  civil  war ; 
and,  in  certain  respects,  it  began  on  very  unequal  terms  between  the  paities.  The 
insurgents  had  been  preparing  for  it  more  than  thirty  years,  while  the  govern- 
ment had  taken  no  steps  to  resist  them.  The  former  had  carefully  considered  all 
the  means  which  could  be  turned  to  their  account.  It  undoubtedly  was  a  well- 
pondered  reliance  with  them  that  in  their  own  unrestricted  efforts  to  destroy  Union, 
Constitution,  and  law,  all  together,  the  government  would,  in  great  degree,  be 
restrained  by  the  same  Constitution  and  law  from  arresting  their  progress. 
Their  sympathizers  pervaded  all  departments  of  the  government  and  nearly  all 
communities  of  the  people.  From  this  material,  under  cover  of  "  liberty  of 
speech,"  "  liberty  of  the  press,"  and  "  habeas  corpus"  they  hoped  to  keep  on 
foot  amongst  us  a  most  efficient  corps  of  spies,  informers,  suppliers,  and  aiders 
and  abettors  of  their  cause  in  a  thousand  ways.  They  knew  that  in  times  such 
as  they  were  inaugurating,  by  the  Constitution  itself,  the  "  habeas  corpus" 
might  be  suspended ;  but  they  also  knew  they  had  friends  who  would  make  a 


question  as  to  who  was  to  suspend  it ;  meanwhile  their  spies  and  others  might  re- 
main at  large  to  help  on  their  cause.  Or  if,  as  has  happened,  the  Executive  should 
suspend  the  writ,  without  ruinous  waste  of  time,  instances  of  arresting  innocent 
persons  might  occur,  as  are  always  likely  to  occur  in  such  cases ;  and  then  a 
clamor  could  be  raised  in  regard  to  this,  which  might  be,  at  least,  of  some  ser- 
vice to  the  insurgent  cause.  It  needed  no  very  keen  perception  to  discover 
this  part  of  the  enemy's  programme,  so  soon  as  by  open  hostilities  their  machinery 
was  fairly  put  in  motion.  Yet,  thoroughly  imbued  with  a  reverence  for  the 
guaranteed  rights  of  individuals,  I  was  slow  to  adopt  the  strong  measures  which 
by  degrees  I  have  been  forced  to  regard  as  being  within  the  exceptions  of  the 
Constitution,  and  as  indispensable  to  the  public  safety.  Nothing  is  better 
known  to  history  than  that  courts  of  justice  are  utterly  incompetent  to  such 
cases.  Civil  courts  are  organized  chiefly  for  trials  of  individuals,  or,  at  most, 
a  few  individuals  acting  in  concert ;  and  this  in  quiet  times,  and  on  charges 
of  crimes  well  defined  in  the  law.  Even  in  times  of  peace  bands  of  horse- 
thieves  and  robbers  frequently  grow  too  numerous  and  po  »verful  for  the  ordinary 
courts  of  justice.  But  what  comparison,  in  numbers,  have  such  bands  ever 
borne  to  the  insurgent  sympathizers  even  in  many  of  the  loyal  States?  Again 
a  jury  too  frequently  has  at  least  one  member  more  ready  to  hang  the  panel 
than  to  hang  the  traitor.  And  yet,  again,  he  who  dissuades  one  man  from 
volunteering,  or  induces  one  soldier  to  desert,  weakens  the  Union  cause  as  much 
as  he  who  kills  a  Union  soldier  in  battle.  Yet  this  dissuasion  or  inducement 
may  be  so  conducted  as  to  be  no  defined  crime  of  which  any  civil  court  would 
take  cognizance. 

Ours  is  a  case  of  rebellion — so  called  by  the  resolutions  before  me — in  fact, 
a  clear,  flagrant,  and  gigantic  case  of  rebellion  ;  and  the  provision  of  the  Consti- 
tution that  "  the  privilege  of  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus  shall  not  be  suspended, 
unless  when,  in  cases  of  rebellion  or  invasion,  the  public  safety  may  require  it,"  is 
the  provision  which  specially  applies  to  our  present  case.  This  provision  plainly 
attests  the  understanding  of  those  who  made  the  Constitution,  that  ordinary  courts 
of  justice  are  inadequate  to  "cases  of  rebellion," — attests  their  purpose  that,  in 
such  cases,  men  may  be  held  in  custody  whom  the  courts,  acting  on  ordinary  rules, 
would  discharge.  Habeas  corpus  does  not  discharge  men  who  are  proved  to  be 
guilty  of  defined  crime;  and  its  suspension  is  allowed  by  the  Constitution  on 
purpose  that  men  may  be  arrested  and  held  who  cannot  be  proved  to  be  guilty 
of  defined  crime,  "  when,  in  cases  of  rebellion  or  invasion,  the  public  safety  may 
require  it."  This  is  precisely  our  present  case — a  case  of  rebellion,  wherein 
the  public  safety  does  require  the  suspension.  Indeed,  arrests  by  process  of 
courts,  and  arrests  in  cases  of  rebellion,  do  not  proceed  altogether  upon  the  same 
basis.  The  former  is  directed  at  the  small  percentage  of  ordinary  and  contin- 
uous perpetration  of  crime,  while  the  latter  is  directed  at  sudden  and  extensive 
uprisings  against  the  government,  \vhich,  at  most,  will  succeed  or  fail  in  no 
great  length  of  time.  In  the  latter  case,  arrests  are  made,  not  so  much  for  what 
has  been  done,  as  for  what  probably  would  be  done.  The  latter  is  more  for  the 


preventive  and  less  for  the  vindictive  than  the  former.  In  such  cases  the  pur- 
poses of  men  are  much  more  easily  understood  than  in  cases  of  ordinary  crime. 
The  man  who  stands  by  and  says  nothing  when  the  peril  of  his  government 
is  discussed,  cannot  be  misunderstood.  If  not  hindered,  he  is  sure  to  help  the 
enemy;  much  more,  if  he  talks  ambiguously — talks  for  his  country  with  "  buts ' 
and  "ifs"  and  "ands."  Of  how  little  value  the  constitutional  provisions  I  have 
quoted  will  be  rendered,  if  arrests  shall  never  be  made  until  defined  crimes  shall 
have  been  committed,  may  be  illustrated  by  a  few  notable  examples.  General 
John  C.  Breckinridge,  General  Robert  E.  Lee,  General  Joseph  E.  Johnston, 
General  John  B.  Magruder,  General  William  B.  Preston,  General  Simon  B. 
Buckner,  and  Commodore  Franklin  Buchanan,  now  occupying  the  very  highest 
places  in  the  rebel  war  service,  were  all  within  the  power  of  the  government 
since  the  rebellion  began,  and  were  nearly  as  well  known  to  be  traitors  then  as 
now.  Unquestionably  if  we  had  seized  ~and  held  them,  the  insurgent  cause 
would  be  much  weaker.  But  no  one  of  them  had  then  committed  any  crime 
defined  in  the  law.  Every  one  of  them,  if  arrested,  would  have  been  discharged 
on  habeas  corpus  were  the  writ  allowed  to  operate.  In  view  of  these  and  similar 
cases,  I  think  the  time  not  unlikely  to  come  when  I  shall  be  blamed  for  having 
made  too  few  arrests  rather  than  too  many. 

By  the  third  resolution  the  meeting  indicate  their  opinion  that  military  arrests 
may  be  constitutional  in  localities  where  rebellion  actually  exists,  but  that  such 
arrests  are  unconstitutional  in  localities  where  rebellion  or  insurrection  does  not 
actually  exist.  They  insist  that  such  arrests  shall  not  be  made  "  outside  of  the 
lines  of  necessary  military  occupation,  and  the  scenes  of  insurrection."  Inas- 
much, however,  as  the  Constitution  itself  makes  no  such  distinction,  I  am  unable 
to  believe  that  there  is  any  such  constitutional  distinction.  I  concede  that  the 
class  of  arrests  complained  of  can  be  constitutional  only  when,  in  cases  of  re- 
bellion or  invasion,  the  public  safety  may  require  them;  and  I  insist  that  in 
such  cases  they  are  constitutional  wherever  the  public  safety  does  require  them ; 
as  well  in  places  to  which  they  may  prevent  the  rebellion  extending  as  in  those 
where  it  may  be  already  prevailing;  as  well  where  they  may  restrain  mischiev- 
ious  interference  with  the  raising  and  supplying  of  armies  to  suppress  the  rebel- 
lion, as  where  the  rebellion  may  actually  be;  as  well  where  they  may  restrain 
the  enticing  men  out  of  the  army,  as  where  they  would  prevent  mutiny  in 
the  army ;  equally  constitutional  at  all  places  where  they  will  conduce  to  the 
public  safety,  as  against  the  dangers  of  rebellion  or  invasion.  Take  the 
particular  case  mentioned  by  the  meeting.  It  is  asserted,  in  substance,  that 
Mr.  Vallandigham  was,  by  a  military  commander,  seized  and  tried  "  for 
no  other  reason  than  words  addressed  to  a  public  meeting,  in  criticism 
of  the  course  of  the  administration,  and  in  condemnation  of  the  military 
orders  of  the  general. "  Now,  if  there  be  no  mistake  about  this ;  if  this 
assertion  is  the  truth  and  the  whole  truth ;  if  there  was  no  other  reason  for  the 
arrest,  then  I  concede  that  the  arrest  was  wrong.  But  the  arrest,  as  I  under- 
stand, was  made  for  a  very  different  reason.  Mr.  Vallaudigham  avows  his  hos- 


tility  to  the  war  on  the  part  of  the  Union ;  and  his  arrest  was  made  because  he 
was  laboring,  with  some  effect,  to  prevent  the  raising  of  troops  ;  to  encourage 
desertions  from  the  army ;  and  to  leave  the  rebellion  without  an  adequate  military 
force  to  suppress  it.  He  was  not  arrested  because  he  was  damaging  the  political 
prospects  of  the  administration,  or  the  personal  interests  of  the  commanding  gen- 
eral, but  because  he  was  damaging  the  army,  upon  the  existence  and  vigor  of 
which  the  life  of  the  nation  depends.  He  was  warring  upon  the  military,  and  this 
gave  the  military  constitutional  jurisdiction  to  lay  hands  upon  him.  If  Mr.  Vallan- 
digham  was  not  damaging  the  military  power  of  the  country,  then  his  arrest 
was  made  on  mistake  of  fact,  which  I  would  be  glad  to  correct  on  reasonably 
satisfactory  evidence. 

I  understand  the  meeting,  whose  resolutions  I  am  considering,  to  be  in  favor 
of  suppressing  the  rebellion  by  military  force — by  armies.  Long  experience 
has  shown  that  armies  cannot  be  maintained  unless  desertion  shall  be  punished 
by  the  severe  penalty  of  death.  The  case  requires,  and  the  law  and  the  con- 
stitution sanction,  this  punishment.  Must  I  shoot  a  simple-minded  soldier  boy 
who  deserts,  while  I  must  not  touch  a  hair  of  a  wily  agitator  who  induces  him 
to  desert  ?  This  is  none  the  less  injurious  when  effected  by  getting  a  father,  or 
brother,  or  friend,  into  a  public  meeting,  and  there  working  upon  his  feelings  till 
he  is  persuaded  to  write  the  soldier  boy  that  he  is  fighting  in  a  bad  cause,  for  a 
wicked  administration  of  a  contemptible  government,  too  weak  to  arrest  and 
punish  him  if  he  shall  desert.  I  think  that  in  such  a  case,  to  silence  the  agita- 
tor and  save  the  boy  is  not  only  constitutional,  but  withal  a  great  mercy. 

If  I  be  wrong  on  this  question  of  constitutional  power,  my  error  lies  in  be- 
lieving that  certain  proceedings  are  constitutional  when,  in  cases  of  rebellion  or 
invasion,  the  public  safety  requires  them,  which  would  not  be  constitutional 
when,  in  absence  of  rebellion  or  invasion,  the  public  safety  does  not  require 
them:  in  other  words,  that  the  constitution  is  not,  in  its  application,  in  all 
respects  the  same,  in  cases  of  rebellion  or  invasion  involving  the  public  safety, 
as  it  is  in  times  of  profound  peace  and  public  security.  The  constitution 
itself  makes  the  distinction ;  and  I  can  no  more  be  persuaded  that  the  govern- 
ment can  constitutionally  take  no  strong  measures  in  time  of  rebellion,  because 
it  can  be  shown  that  the  same  could  not  be  lawfully  taken  in  time  of  peace 
than  I  can  be  persuaded  that  a  particular  drug  is  not  good  medicine  for  a  sick 
man,  because  it  can  be  shown  to  not  be  good  food  for  a  well  one.  Nor  am  I  able  to 
appreciate  the  danger  apprehended  by  the  meeting  that  the  American  people 
will,  by  means  of  military  arrests  during  the  rebellion,  lose  the  right  of  public 
discussion,  the  liberty  of  speech  and  the  press,  the  law  of  evidence,  trial  by 
jury,  and  habeas  corpus,  throughout  the  indefinite  peaceful  future,  which  I  trust 
lies  before  them,  any  more  than  I  am  able  to  believe  that  a  man  could  contract 
so  strong  an  appetite  for  emetics  during  temporary  illness  as  to  persist  in  feeding 
upon  them  during  the  remainder  of  his  healthful  life. 

In  giving  the  resolutions  that  earnest  consideration  which  you  request  of  me, 
I  cannot  overlook  the  fact  that  the  meeting  speak  as  "democrats.  "     Nor  can  I, 


8 

with  full  respect  for  their  known  intelligence,  and  the  fairly  presumed  deliberation 
with  which  they  prepared  their  resolutions,  be  permitted  to  suppose  that  this 
occurred  by  accident,  or  in  any  way  other  than  that  they  preferred  to  designate 
themselves  "  democrats"  rather  than  "American  citizens."  In  this  time  of  na- 
tional peril  I  would  have  preferred  to  meet  you  upon  a  level  one  step  higher  than 
any  party  platform  ;  because  I  am  sure  that,  from  such  more  elevated  position,  we 
could  do  better  battle  for  the  country  we  all  love  than  we  possibly  can  from  those 
lower  ones  where,  from  the  force  of  habit,  the  prejudices  of  the  past,  and  selfish 
hopes  of  the  future,  we  are  sure  to  expend  much  of  our  ingenuity  and  strength  in 
finding  fault  with,  and  aiming  blows  at,  each  other.  Bat,  since  you  have  denied 
me  this,  I  will  yet  be  thankful,  for  the  country's  sake,  that  not  all  democrats 
have  done  so.  He  on  whose  discretionary  judgment  Mr.  Vallandigham  was 
arrested  and  tried  is  a  democrat,  having  no  old  party  affinity  with  me ;  and  the 
judge  who  rejected  the  constitutional  view  expressed  in  these  resolutions,  by 
refusing  to  discharge  Mr.  Vallandigham  on  habeas  corpus  is  a  democrat  of 
better  days  than  these,  having  received  his  judicial  mantle  at  the  hands  of 
President  Jackson.  And  still  more,  of  all  those  democrats  who  are  nobly 
exposing  their  lives  and  shedding  their  blood  on  the  battle-field,  I  have  learned 
that  many  approve  the  course  taken  with  Mr.  Vallandigham,  while  I  have  not 
heard  of  a  single  one  condemning  it.  I  cannot  assert  that  there  are  none  such. 
And  the  name  of  President  Jackson  recalls  an  instance  of  pertinent  history. 
After  the  battle  of  New  Orleans,  and  while  the  fact  that  the  treaty  of  peace  had 
been  concluded  was  well  known  in  the  city,  but  before  official  knowledge  of  it  had 
arrived,  General  Jackson  still  maintained  martial  or  military  law.  Now,  that  it 
could  be  said  the  war  was  over,  the  clamor  against  martial  law,  which  had 
existed  from  the  first,  grew  more  furious.  Among  other  things  a  Mr.  Louaillier 
published  a  denunciatory  newspaper  article.  General  Jackson  arrested  him.  A 
lawyer  by  the  name  of  Morel  procured  the  United  States  Judge  Hall  to  order 
a  writ  of  habeas  corpus  to  relieve  Mr.  Louaillier.  General  Jackson  arrested 
both  the  lawyer  and  the  judge.  A  Mr.  Hollander  ventured  to  say  of  some 
part  of  the  matter  that  "it  was  a  dirty  trick."  General  Jackson  arrested  him. 
When  the  officer  undertook  to  serve  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus,  General  Jack- 
son took  it  from  him,  and  sent  him  away  with  a  copy.  Holding  the  judge  in 
custody  a  few  days,  the  general  sent  him  beyond  the  limits  of  his  encampment, 
and  set  him  at  liberty,  with  an  order  to  remain  till  the  ratification  of  peace 
should  be  regularly  announced,  or  until  the  British  should  have  left  the  southern 
coast.  A  day  or  two  more  elapsed,  the  ratification  of  the  treaty  of  peace  was 
regularly  announced,  and  the  judge  and  others  were  fully  liberated.  A  few 
days  more,  and  the  judge  called  General  Jackson  into  court  and  fined  him  a 
thousand  dollars  for  having  arrested  him  and  the  others  named.  The  general 
paid  the  fine,  and  there  the  matter  rested  for  nearly  thirty  years,  when  Congress 
refunded  principal  and  interest.  The  late  Senator  Douglas,  then  in  the  House 
of  Representatives,  took  a  leading  part  in  the  debates,  in  which  the  constitu- 


tional  question  was  much  discussed.     I  am  not  prepared  to  say  whom  the  jour- 
nals would  show  to  have  voted  for  the  measure. 

It  may  he  remarked  :  First,  that  we  had  the  same  Constitution  then  as  now ; 
secondly,  that  we  then  had  a  case  of  invasion,  and  now  we  have  a  case  of 
rebellion ;  and,  thirdly,  that  the  permanent  right  of  the  people  to  public  dis- 
cussion, the  liberty  of  speech  and  of  the  press,  the  trial  by  jury,  the  law  of 
evidence,  and  the  habeas  corpus,  suffered  no  detriment  whatever  by  that  con- 
duct of  General  Jackson,  or  its  subsequent  approval  by  the  American  Congress. 

And  yet,  let  me  say,  that  in  my  own  discretion,  I  do  not  know  whether  I 
would  have  ordered  the  arrest  of  Mr.  Vallandigham.  While  I  cannot  shift  the 
responsibility  from  myself,  I  hold  that,  as  a  general  rule,  the  commander  in  the 
field  is  the  better  judge  of  the  necessity  in  any  particular  case.  Of  course,  I 
must  practice  n  general  directory  and  revisory  power  in  the  matter. 

One  of  the  resolutions  expresses  the  opinion  of  the  meeting  that  arbitrary 
arrests  will  have  the  effect  to  divide  and  distract  those  who  should  be  united  in 
suppressing  the  rebellion,  and  I  am  specifically  called  on  to  discharge  Mr. 
Vallandigham.  I  regard  this  as,  at  least,  a  fair  appeal  to  me  on  the  expediency 
of  exercising  a  constitutional  power  which  I  think  exists.  In  response  to  such 
appeal  I  have  to  say,  it  gave  me  pain  when  I  learned  that  Mr.  Vallandigham 
had  been  arrested — that  is,  I  was  pained  that  there  should  have  seemed  to  be  a 
necessity  for  arresting  him — and  that  it  will  afford  me  great  pleasure  to  discharge 
him  so  soon  as  I  can,  by  any  means,  believe  the  public  safety  will  not  suffer  by  it. 
I  further  say,  that  as  the  war  progresses,  it  appears  to  me,  opinion  and  action, 
which  were  in  great  confusion  at  first,  take  shape  and  fall  into  more  regular 
channels,  so  that  the  necessity  for  strong  dealing  with  them  gradually  de- 
creases. I  have  every  reason  to  desire  that  it  should  cease  altogether,  and  far 
from  the  least  is  my  regard  for  the  opinions  and  wishes  of  those  who,  like  the 
meeting  at  Albany,  declare  their  purpose  to  sustain  the  government  in  every 
constitutional  and  lawful  measure  to  suppress  the  rebellion.  Still,  I  must  con- 
tinue to  do  so  much  as  may  seem  to  be  required  by  the  public  safety. 

A.  LINCOLN. 


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